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ABSTRACT
Following a series of high profile miscarriages of justice in the UK linked to questionable
expert evidence, the post of the Forensic Science Regulator was created in 2008. The main
objective of this role is to improve the standard of practitioner competencies and forensic
procedures. One of the key strategies deployed to achieve this is the push to incorporate
a greater level of scientific conduct in the various fields of forensic practice. Currently,
there is no statutory requirement for practitioners to become accredited to continue working
with the Criminal Justice System of England and Wales. However, the Forensic Science
Regulator is lobbying the UK Government to make this mandatory. This paper focuses on
the challenge of incorporating a scientific methodology to digital forensic investigations where
malicious software (‘malware’) has been identified. One aspect of such a methodology is the
approach followed to both select and evaluate the tools used to perform dynamic malware
analysis during an investigation. Based on the literature, legal, regulatory, and practical
needs, we derive a set of requirements to address this challenge. We present a framework,
called the ‘Malware Analysis Tool Evaluation Framework’ (MATEF), to address this lack of
methodology to evaluate software tools used to perform dynamic malware analysis during
investigations involving malware and discuss how it meets the derived requirements.
Keywords: malware forensics, digital forensics, tool testing, expert evidence, trust, require-
ments
1. INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon during cybercrime in-
vestigations to discover malware. In R v
Oliver (R v Oliver [2016] EWCA Crim 1053),
a ‘Trojan defense’ was offered to account for
the presence of indecent images on a com-
puter, while in R v Dan (R v Dan [2019]
EWCA Crim 1985) it was argued that a
“malware bug potentially affected its oper-
ation.”
In the UK, the Criminal Procedure Rules
(Ministry of Justice, 2015) stipulate that
digital forensic practitioners have a duty to
assist the court in their understanding of the
evidence tendered. Therefore, they also have
a duty to identify the capabilities of any mal-
ware identified during their investigation and
make a determination as to the bearing it has
(if any) on the conclusions reached.
To undertake this duty (and hence form
an opinion on the impact of any malware),
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the forensic practitioner is reliant on their
tools, skills, and knowledge of malware to
detect, identify and study the behaviour of
any identified malware. However, practition-
ers are relying on anecdotal or otherwise lim-
ited scientific principles to form their conclu-
sions on such impact (Kennedy, 2017). This
is contrary to scientifically based decision
making, which is “an assumed trait of the
practitioner, rather than a formally taught
competency” (Horsman, 2019a).
This is in part due to the lack of an es-
tablished methodology for malware foren-
sics undertaken as part of a criminal in-
vestigation. The unpredictable nature of
malware means this lack of an established
methodology could violate legislation such
as the Computer Misuse Act (1990). It
could also violate technically led best prac-
tice guidelines (Williams, 2012) and, more
recently, the quality focused Codes of Prac-
tice and Conduct (Forensic Science Regu-
lator, 2020b), hereafter referred to as “the
Codes.”
One aspect of such a methodology is the
approach followed to both select and eval-
uate the tools used to analyse the mal-
ware and the artefacts it produces. Broadly
speaking, there are two approaches used to
study malware: dynamic and static. The
former monitors malware that is operational.
The latter examines malware in a passive
state by studying the underlying code, for
example. Tools will generally support one
(sometimes both) of these approaches. Ex-
isting methods to evaluate tools in a conven-
tional digital forensic examination include
‘dual-tool verification’ promoted by the As-
sociation of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
(Clarke, 2009). Arguments that a tool has
been widely accepted in case law (Guidance
Software Inc., 2014) are open to challenge
when examined at a statistically significant
scale (Kennedy, 2017) and limited in their
utility (Horsman, 2019b).
This work provides a foundation to deter-
mine if a systematic basis for trusted prac-
tice could be established for evaluating mal-
ware artefact detection tools used within a
forensic investigation. The contributions of
the work are to (a) identify the legislative,
technical, and quality requirements of mal-
ware forensic practice; (b) provide a frame-
work to address these requirements.
The structure of this paper is as follows:
Section 2 explores the background and re-
lated work, while section 3 derives the re-
quirements for undertaking malware foren-
sics. Section 4 describes a framework to ad-
dress these requirements. Section 5 reflects
on the framework and the extent to which
the requirements have been addressed, while
section 6 draws conclusions and identifies
further work.
2. BACKGROUND
AND RELATED WORK
The digital fields of malware and forensics
are increasingly being combined to describe
what Malin et al. (2008) term malware
forensics. As a field of study in its own
right, universities are now beginning to offer
malware forensics either as a whole course/-
module (University of Portsmouth, 2019) or
as part of related modules, such as Digital
Forensics (University of London, 2020).
The original motivation for this work
arose from the realisation that digital foren-
sic practitioners were conducting malware
forensic investigations in a largely anecdo-
tal manner. This may be in part due to the
fact that there is little published material
establishing a scientific basis for procedures
applied to conducting a malware forensic in-
vestigation, and more specifically, for evalu-
ating the tools to do so. Liu et al. (2017) ap-
plied malware ontology techniques to assist
investigators by providing a means to cat-
egorise malware behaviour in terms of one
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of five broad categories. The definitions ap-
plied, lack a rationale and do not address
malware that occupies more than one cat-
egory. Furthermore, while helpful to a lay
audience, the approach does not assist in-
vestigators in understanding the impact (if
any) of any malware found on a computer
under investigation.
The use of malware forensics is cited by
Kim et al. (2014), who presented a model
to investigate fraud using “malware forensic”
techniques. Provataki and Katos (2013) of-
fered a framework that extends the function-
ality of the Cuckoo sandbox (Cuckoo Foun-
dation, 2016) to understand malware’s be-
haviour but not to evaluate the tools used to
study such behaviour. Shosha et al. (2013)
explored the limitations of dynamic mal-
ware analysis techniques for digital investi-
gations, which are highlighted and propose a
methodology to analyse malicious code run-
ning in forensically acquired computer mem-
ory. However, the methodology proposed is
only applicable to the analysis of code run-
ning in memory and is not based on any for-
mal requirements analysis.
A malware analysis approach was pro-
posed by Ianelli et al. (2007), who suggested
that the presence of malware can be ad-
dressed by examination of the network traf-
fic logs. However, this suggestion assumes
that such logs are more likely to be found
in a corporate than domestic environment.
Hence, a suspect accused of committing an
offence via their home router will typically
have far fewer logs and detail to assist their
defence than in a commercial environment,
where there would likely be more sophisti-
cated logging available.
Malin et al. (2008) presented one of the
few books on malware forensics, more re-
cently split into separate Windows (2012)
and Linux (2013) editions. Carvey (2012)
also provided some coverage of the topic
across two chapters from an investigative
perspective, as part of a more general dig-
ital forensics discussion. Each of these
texts presents a collection of tools and tech-
niques to address various aspects of analy-
sis, but none attempt to develop and eval-
uate a general-purpose framework for mal-
ware analysis or a rigorous, scientific means
to evaluate the tools used.
The lack of a formalised approach means
it is also not uncommon to find tools not
specifically designed for forensic use being
deployed. Hughes and Varol (2020) argued
that the use of malware scanners, employed
to identify malware in a forensic investiga-
tion, will not meet all possible functional re-
quirements. For example, such tools are not
designed to detect malware that previously
existed on a machine and is now located in
areas such as slack space, unused partitions,
and deleted files. Thus, the validity of tools
(and hence any resulting conclusions) can be
undermined by their application to scenarios
for which they were not designed.
Perhaps more significantly, the lack of a
formalised approach means that court pro-
ceedings involving malware may not be ad-
equately investigated. Such cases will in-
evitably become a candidate for miscarriages
of justice, as the court would be forming a
judgment without being fully informed of the
facts. Some of the challenges that can im-
pair an investigation involving malware are
explored below.
2.1 The Trojan Defence
Separating user actions from those of ma-
licious software is the fundamental objec-
tive when investigating the Trojan defence,
where a defendant can claim the illegal ac-
tivity recorded on a device is the result of
malware and not their own actions. Brown
(2015) highlighted the Trojan defence as one
of several tactics used by counsel to raise
doubt as to the authenticity of the electronic
evidence presented to the court. Bowles and
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Hernandez-Castro (2015) highlighted “clear
and obvious mistakes” with regard to Trojan
defence cases in a study covering a 10 year
period.
The problem of attribution is anticipated
to become more challenging in the near fu-
ture with the nefarious use of artificial in-
telligence (AI) to enhance malware. Thanh
and Zelinka (2019) warn of an upcoming ‘AI-
powered malware era,’ citing proof of con-
cept work that demonstrates that ‘computa-
tional intelligence could be used to enhance
malware. This warning is echoed by Truong
et al. (2020) who identify deep learning tech-
niques being applied to malware.
Bikeev et al. (2019) explored the chal-
lenges of applying mens rea to malicious AI
and Bahnsen et al. (2018) developed an al-
gorithm to enhance AI to be more effective
during malicious phishing attacks. Along-
side malware and AI, doubt in the reliability
of digital evidence can also originate from
the methodologies followed by forensic prac-
titioners. Perhaps the most significant of
these is an over dependence on anecdotal ex-
perience when reaching conclusions.
2.2 Repeated Confirmation
Sceptical digital forensic practitioners may
defer to their anecdotal experience to ar-
gue that they are “yet to see an example”
(McLinden, 2009) and similarly that they
“haven’t seen a single case” (Douglas, 2007)
of malware attributed to the downloading
of indecent images of children. Similarly,
the results from mainstream digital foren-
sic tools have been accepted “based solely
on the reputation of the vendor” (Garfinkel,
Farrell, Roussev, & Dinolt, 2009). Such ar-
guments are formulated on inductive reason-
ing, derived from repeated confirmation. Al-
though useful to develop hypothesises, in-
ductive reasoning cannot be used to test sci-
entific theory (Levitin, 2016). There are also
challenges in the processing and reasoning
that are applied to expert evidence.
2.3 Ubiquitous Problems
With Expert Evidence
Challenges with the evidence include experts
who step outside of their own expertise. The
now infamous trials of R v Clark [2003]
EWCA Crim 1020, R v Cannings [2004]
EWCA Crim 1 and R v Patel [2003] pro-
vide examples of where the defence expert,
Professor Sir Roy Meadows, made a num-
ber of claims that had “no statistical basis”
(Royal Statistical Society, 2001). Following
these events, the Law Commission’s review
(2011) of expert evidence in criminal trials
called for a move to incorporate a greater
level of scientific principles and provenance
in expert evidence.
Challenges also arise with failures to find
and/or disclose evidence correctly. Bowcott
(2018) cites problems at a series of criminal
trials where digital evidence was either not
found nor passed to the defence team during
disclosure.
Problems with expert evidence are not
limited to the UK alone. Edmond and Vulle
(2014) examined the use of forensic science
evidence in trials and concluded three sepa-
rate criminal justice systems (United States,
Switzerland and Australia) each failed to
identify “deep structural and endemic prob-
lems with many types of forensic science.”
Edmond and Vulle (2014) go on to argue
that these problems extend to the use of lan-
guage by experts, stating that the “expres-
sions used by analysts are not empirically
based.” This is echoed by Adam (2016), who
argues that language used for conclusions
such as ‘it is likely is based on posterior prob-
abilities and so implies probabilistic support
to the conclusion. However, such phrases al-
most never provide any detail on how the
likelihood has been reached. Such a conclu-
sion could be based on unreported proper-
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ties of items considered or entirely subjec-
tive. Similarly, Adam (2016) goes on to chal-
lenge the phrase ‘is consistent with,’ which
states some (unknown) degree of similarity
between two things. Typically, either no al-
ternative sources are given or a sense of how
common the ‘consistent’ features are in the
wider population. The misuse of language in
this way may be linked to a lack of under-
standing of the underlying scientific princi-
ples by practitioners.
2.4 Lack Of Scientific
Principles
Casey (2019) argues that digital forensics is
distinct from forensic science “despite over a
decade of effort to break down the borders
between them.” He goes on to argue that
some practitioners accept results as “fac-
tual,” failing to recognise the need for sci-
entific treatment. This leads to problems in
recognising and reporting error rates, quan-
tifying levels of confidence in findings, or
reporting on alternative interpretations of
findings. Christensen et al. (2014) ar-
gue that practitioners appear to have ei-
ther misunderstood the term ‘error’ or lacked
the skills to apply statistics or the scien-
tific method correctly. They add, practi-
tioners have reportedly claimed either that
there is a zero error rate, that such an error
rate cannot be estimated or that practition-
ers have attempted to “calculate error rates
post facto.”
The challenges faced by the digital foren-
sics field are exacerbated within the rela-
tively young malware forensics field by is-
sues such as malware routinely obfuscating
its true intentions and hindering attempts
to analyse it (Wagener, Dulaunoy, Engel,
2008). There is, therefore, a level of uncer-
tainty associated with any conclusions drawn
from malware forensics. This uncertainty
can be used to raise a reasonable doubt
about the true nature and intentions of mal-
ware. Furthermore, the complexity of the
subject matter and the specialist skills re-
quired to study it (e.g., reverse engineering
assembly language) may make the specialty
less accessible to practitioners.
This perceived lack of scientific principles
arguably also informs the methods used by
practitioners to test software tools when at-
tempting to evaluate the reproducibility of
the results reported.
2.5 Reproducibility flaws
Techniques such as dual-tool verification are
used by practitioners to “confirm result in-
tegrity during analysis” (Forensic control,
2011). To state that two observations “con-
firm,” a finding is a bold claim and little
more than an example of repeated confirma-
tion. It also fails to consider the possibil-
ity that both tools are incorrect and simply
(erroneously) in agreement (Beckett & Slay,
2007). Hence use of Dual-tool verification in
this way cannot confirm a result, but it can
corroborate it on a statistically insignificant
scale, identifying any discrepancies. An ex-
ample of this arose in the trial of Anthony
Casey (State of Florida v. Casey Marie An-
thony, 2011) where a discrepancy was identi-
fied between two Internet history tools used
to produce expert testimony.
2.6 Emerging statutory
requirements
The importance of establishing quality stan-
dards for forensic science practice has be-
come increasingly apparent in recent years.
Interest in this has been expressed through-
out the European Union (EU) by forensic in-
stitutions, the scientific community, as well
as judicial and political stakeholders (van
Ruth Smithuis, 2019).
Consequently, a European Council Frame-
work Decision was passed requiring all mem-
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ber states to set up systems to accredit their
forensic service providers carrying out labo-
ratory activities. The UK’s response to this
was to form the post of the Forensic Science
Regulator (FSR). The FSR’s Codes (2020b)
place an obligation on practitioners to gain
accreditation that is mapped to the interna-
tional standard ISO/IEC 17025 and “embed
a systematic approach to quality” (Tully et
al., 2020).
2.7 Summary
Given the reasons for the appointment of
a FSR and the push to make the qual-
ity standards statutory, the issues identified
currently undermine the trust that can be
placed in findings tendered in criminal pro-
ceedings.
The production of digital evidence, there-
fore, requires the use of reliable tools and
competent practitioners who use appropri-
ate scientific language to instill the condi-
tions for trusted practice, particularly when
using tools to analyse malware as part of a
digital forensic investigation.
Given malware forensics is an emerging
field, there is a need to develop a scien-
tific methodology to formalise the practice
and hence underpin trusted practice in the
field. In particular, a methodology to quan-
tifiably evaluate tools used as part of a mal-
ware forensic investigation needs to be estab-
lished. The next section will focus on iden-
tifying the requirements for such a method-
ology.
3. REQUIREMENTS
FOR CONDUCTING
MALWARE FORENSICS
The elicitation of requirements can be done
from multiple sources and not simply stake-
holders alone (Burnay, 2016). In his study,
Burnay (2016) found that eliciting require-
ments from existing documentation to be
significantly faster than the use of stakehold-
ers. It was also found that there were several
examples of where stakeholders made state-
ments that conflicted with formally docu-
mented requirements and so were either in-
correct or simply misunderstood by stake-
holders.
The use of authoritative document sources
such as legislation and regulatory guidance
already embodies the requirements of stake-
holders, and so we took a document study
approach to derive the requirements for con-
ducting malware forensics.
Having considered the methodology, the
issue of addressing trusted practice in mal-
ware forensics could begin by better explor-
ing what is meant by trust. This can be
defined as “willingly acting without the full
knowledge needed to act” (Duranti Rogers,
2012). In the context of the Criminal Justice
System involving expert evidence, this trans-
lates to a Court coming to a decision on the
reliability of such evidence-based upon two
forms of trust: the expert and their evidence.
The former concerns the expert’s knowl-
edge and skills, as well as their ability to
communicate these effectively and fairly. A
shortfall in one of these areas can impact
the interpretation of the evidence or its pro-
bative value (see Problems with expert evi-
dence, above).
The latter relates to the trust placed on
the reliability of the evidence itself. Since the
repeal of section 69 of the Police and Crimi-
nal Evidence Act 1984, the Crown Prosecu-
tion Service (CPS) issued guidance stating
that any evidence produced by a computer is
presumed to be reliable (CPS, 2014). How-
ever, the formation of the FSR and the as-
sociated Codes (2020b) indicate that expert
evidence has transitioned from an assumed,
innate trust to one that is now externally
validated. The CPS, FSR, and practitioners
themselves are all stakeholders in this pro-
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cess, each having their own requirements.
3.1 Legal Requirements
As with digital forensic practice in general,
the legal requirements for malware forensic
practice can be divided into lawful practice
and admissibility. For the former, the pri-
mary risks are in the handling of the malware
files themselves and potential breaches of the
computer misuse and/or data protection leg-
islation. The latter requires that any out-
put of a tool used to analyse malware which
is tendered as evidence must be admissible.
This broadly translates to a person familiar
with the expected output of a computer be-
ing available to give evidence (Lloyd, 2020).
However, few people would be familiar with
the expected output of a tool used to anal-
yse malware, which typically produces un-
predictable artefacts.
Guidance on expert evidence from the
CPS (2019) states that expert evidence will
be admissible under common law where:
• It will be of assistance to the court
• The expert has relevant expertise
• The expert is impartial
• The expert evidence is reliable
The first of these requirements concerns the
forming of a judgement on the probative
value of the evidence tendered, whilst the
second and third concern a judgement on
the expert. The last requirement concerns
both the evidence and the manner in which
it was produced. In their guidance, the
CPS defines reliable evidence in terms of it
having a “scientific basis.” This indicates a
scientific methodology characterised by at-
tributes such as repeatability, reproducibil-
ity, a testable hypothesis, controllability, and
being unbiased.
Further to the above, the CPS acknowl-
edge that novel techniques are frequently
Table 1. R v Lundy Guidelines.
used in a fast-evolving technology discipline
and defer to the recommendations of R v
Lundy ([2013] UKPC 28), see Table 1, re-
ferred to hereafter as the “Lundy Guide-
lines”:
In response to some of the problems out-
lined in the introduction, regulatory codes of
practice have been introduced.
3.2 Regulatory requirements
Practitioners tendering expert evidence
within the criminal justice system are ex-
pected to align their practice to regulatory
standards, namely the Codes published by
the FSR (2020b). Currently, there is no
statutory requirement for practitioners to
align their work to the Codes, but the FSR
is lobbying the UK Government to make
this mandatory (Forensic Science Regulator,
2020a).
The Codes stipulate that software tools
must be validated (Section 24.1.2 of the
Codes) and that an estimate of uncertainty
be provided (Section 22 of the Codes). Fur-
thermore, any reference datasets used to test
tools against should also be reported (Sec-
tion 23.4 of the Codes). Each of these re-
quirements is now considered in turn.
Validation The Codes define validation as
a means to demonstrate that a “method,
process or device is fit for the specific pur-
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pose intended.” Although not specifically
mentioned, the meaning of ‘device’ could
readily be applied to a software device or
tool. However, it is not clear how such val-
idation is performed or what metrics should
be used to inform a decision how ‘fit for pur-
pose’ a device is, e.g., accuracy, repeatabil-
ity, etc.
One measure readily available is that of er-
ror, i.e., the difference between the expected
and observed values (Kat Els, 2012). Ma-
lin et al. (2008) point out that the names
of artefacts (such as filenames) are typically
randomly assigned. In light of this, it is
reasonable to expect artefact values to vary
much more than the quantity of artefacts
produced each time a malware binary is ex-
ecuted. Such behaviour can be validated by
repeatedly executing malware and monitor-
ing the quantity of artefacts produced. Fur-
thermore, to quantify and enable a statisti-
cal analysis of the error, a methodology for
testing tools used for malware analysis could
examine the difference in artefact quantities,
rather than the values themselves.
Validation of a tool measuring artefacts
produced by malware is complicated by the
fact that malware employs techniques (of-
ten termed ‘anti-forensic’) to obfuscate the
truth. Hence ‘ground truth’ is difficult to
establish. One way forward is to compare
what is reported by a tool against an inde-
pendent and trusted source or ‘oracle.’ This
will require the testing methodology to (a)
determine the expected value from an inde-
pendent source and (b) be capable of retriev-
ing the observed number of artefacts from a
variety of tools applied to the framework for
testing.
Estimate of uncertainty A measure of
statistical confidence can contribute to an
estimate of uncertainty. One way to calcu-
late this would be to run multiple tests un-
der the same conditions and record the er-
ror between the expected and observed num-
bers of artefacts. The rationale behind this
is that the ISO/IEC 17025 Standard (ISO,
2005) upon which the Codes are based de-
rives its definition of uncertainty from the
Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in
Measurement (GUM), produced by the Joint
Committee for Guides in Metrology (JCGM)
(2008). In this document, uncertainty is de-
fined in terms of the “dispersion of the val-
ues” associated with an observable quantity.
Acknowledging the two components of error
(systematic and random), they add that ran-
dom error “. . . can usually be reduced by in-
creasing the number of observations”. Fur-
thermore, calculating the experimental stan-
dard deviation “of the arithmetic mean or
average of a series of observations” provides
“a measure of the uncertainty of the mean
due to random effects.”
Hence, by running sufficient tests, it would
be possible to plot frequency distributions
with associated confidence intervals. Simi-
larly, by varying the conditions of tests, it
would become possible to see the impact of
such changes upon the level of uncertainty
in the results.
Reference data sets Becket (2010) states
there is a “need” for forensic practitioners to
demonstrate that “certified reference mate-
rials” have been used to evaluate their tools,
citing Section 5.6.3.2 of the ISO/IEC 17025
Standard (ISO, 2005). This is not quite
accurate as the same section of the Stan-
dard states this should be done “where possi-
ble.” Section 21.2.64(h) of the Codes requires
there to be a plan in place for the use of such
data. A number of attempts over the years
have been made by the scientific commu-
nity to address the lack of standardised test
data; these include test images produced by
Carrier (2010), the Computer Forensic Ref-
erence Data Sets (CFReDS) project (NIST,
2016), and the Digital Corpora (2017) de-
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veloped by Garfinkel et al. (2009) as an
extensive collection of both fabricated and
real data. However, there are also datasets
that include malware samples, such as con-
tagion (2020) and VirusShare (2020) these
(like those above) are not labelled as being
certified.
Aside from legal and regulatory require-
ments, the handling and analysis of mal-
ware reveal a number of technical require-
ments identified by the literature for mal-
ware forensics practice.
3.3 Practice requirements
The following practice requirements have
been identified:
Virtual Machines Malin et al. (2008)
recommend the use of Virtual Machines
(VMs), particularly as this provides testing
at scale and speed. Hence greater numbers
of tests can be performed for repeatability
or breadth of testing purposes. To facilitate
this, testing should be automated as far as
practically possible. In addition, to minimise
the risk of malware escaping from a Win-
dows Guest VM (Tank, Aggarwal, Chaubey,
2019), a Linux host should be used.
In considering the use of virtual machines,
it should be noted that malware can detect
virtual environments and change their be-
haviour or even become ‘misleading’ (Fer-
rie, 2007). However, it is also noted that in
recognition of the ubiquitous use of virtual
servers, a shift in malware no longer avoid-
ing virtual environments has also taken place
(Wueest, 2014).
Network services Isolating malware
from a network or even the Internet
could limit the behaviour exhibited (Deng
Mirkovic, 2018). To counter this, it is a
good idea to provide the malware with as
many services as possible that it is likely
to rely upon, such as SMTP, HTTP, and
DNS. The use of iNetSim (Hungenberg
Eckert, 2016) is a popular choice in this
area. Phu et al. (2019) use it to trap DNS
queries from malware under analysis using
an iNetSim simulated network; Sikorski
Honig (2012) use it to simulate a broader
range of network services; a mixed solution
is proposed by Palkmets et al. (2014) who
additionally provide a route to the Internet
via an onion router network; a malware
clustering technique is offered by Fang et al.
(2020) who use iNetSim to provide a means
to identify the family of malware under
analysis.
Vulnerable environment Alongside net-
work services, vulnerable environments are
also key to maximising the behaviour of mal-
ware (Szor, 2005). This is echoed by Malin
et al. (2008) and Elisan (2015), who goes
further and anecdotally promote the use of
“malware friendly” configurations. These in-
clude assigning administrator rights to the
default user account, disabling auto updates,
disabling User Access Control (UAC), set-
ting the Internet browser to the minimum
security level, installing commonly exploited
software, and creating honeypot files with
filenames such as “salaries.xls.”
Black box testing Many of the tools used
by digital forensic practitioners, including
the mainstream forensic software tools, are
closed source (Talib, 2018). Hence there is
no access to verify the underlying algorithms
used (Horsman, 2019b). Therefore, a black
box testing strategy is more viable than a
white box testing approach. Furthermore,
digital forensic practitioners would have nei-
ther the time nor the skills to review source
code (Horsman, 2020).
The above requirements have been in-
cluded in the framework and are summarised
in Table 2.
With the requirements identified, the fol-
lowing section will identify the aims of a
framework to test tools used for malware
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forensics in light of the above requirements.
4. DESIGN OF THE
FRAMEWORK
Having identified the requirements for con-
ducting malware forensics, it follows that the
aims for a framework to address these re-
quirements also need to be determined.
4.1 Aims
Malware investigations can use a variety of
software tools, some of which make claims
to be suited for malware analysis. The pro-
posed framework, referred to as the Mal-
ware Analysis Tool Evaluation Framework
(MATEF), should provide a mechanism to
evaluate these tools by quantifying their
ability to detect artefacts produced by real-
world malware samples (see Aim 1, Table 3).
Malin et al. (2008) argued that mawlare
analysis could be divided into three broad
techniques: temporal, relational, and func-
tional analysis. Temporal analysis is con-
cerned with the timeline of events surround-
ing reported activity, while relational analy-
sis refers to the interaction between compo-
nents of the malware and its environment.
Finally, functional analysis relates to the ac-
tions the malware is reported to have per-
formed.
The MATEF provides a mechanism to
evaluate dynamic analysis software tools. It
provides a means to measure the extent to
which tools detect the artefacts produced by
malware behaviour (see Aim 2, Table 3). On
a Windows computer, this behaviour typi-
cally manifests itself in the form of file, reg-
istry, process, and network based artefacts.
Unlike regular software that is largely pre-
dictable, malware can be unpredictable in
that some behaviour (and hence artefacts)
may not be observed. This can happen
when the required (and unknown) trigger
conditions for a given binary are not met
(Nataraj, Karthikeyan, Jacob, Manjunath,
2011). Thus, the behaviour of malware can
be nondeterministic and vary, particularly if
it is of a type that communicates with a
Command and Control (CC) server (Akin-
rolabu, Agrafiotis, Erola, 2018).
Furthermore, malware can include ‘mea-
sures to impede automatic and manual anal-
yses’ (D’Elia, Coppa, Palmaro, Cavallaro,
2020). Strategies include code obfuscation
(Singh Singh, 2018), detection of debug-
gers or virtual machines (Chen, Huygens,
Desmet, Joosen, 2016), and deployment
of ‘split-personality’ malware techniques to
change the behaviour of code when it is sub-
jected to analysis (Murali, Ravi, Agarwal,
2020). Such techniques are designed to give
misleading results under analysis. Hence
mitigation against such risks should be con-
sidered when drawing conclusions from the
testing of tools used to study malware, see
Aim 3, Table 3.
Having identified the aims of the frame-
work, consideration was then given as to how
to achieve these aims. Hence, the following
section seeks to identify the main compo-
nents of the framework.
Table 2. Aims of the framework.
4.2 Identifying selecting the
main components of the
framework
The MATEF framework includes a number
of components to satisfy the aims identified
in Table 3. Each of these elements is briefly
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Table 3. Proposed requirements.
explored in the following sections, starting
with the malware binaries themselves.
Malware sample source To maximise
the validity of the evaluation process, real-
world malware (a.k.a. malware ‘in the wild’)
is used instead of fabricated malware (see
Aim 1, Table 3). The stored malware em-
ploys password protected zip files to min-
imise the contamination risk during handling
(see Requirement 1, Table 2). All samples
© 2020 JDFSL Page 11
Volume 15 Article 3 TOWARDS INCREASING TRUST...
are analysed offline (see Requirement 1, Ta-
ble 2). Malware can be obtained from any
source and imported into the malware li-
brary.
Malware library The malware library is
a store of malware executables, each acces-
sible through a consistent file naming con-
vention, thus facilitating automation and use
of VMs (see Requirement 10, Table 2). Ac-
cess to this library is restricted to authorised
users of the framework only (see Require-
ment 1, Table 2).
In addition to the malware binary file, in-
formation on its expected behaviour should
also be stored locally as well (satisfying re-
quirement 14 from Table 2). To be made
readily available, this information will be
stored in a malware database.
Malware database The malware
database stores properties of each mal-
ware binary held in the malware library. As
a minimum, the details stored include the
hash value of the binary and the number of
artefacts generated as a result of creating,
modifying, or deleting files or registry keys.
In addition, also stored are the number
of ports opened and processes spawned as
a result of executing the malware using
automation scripts.
Manager scripts The manager scripts
perform two fundamental roles. The first of
these is the management of the database and
the tool testing process, through tasks such
as initiating a bank of virtual machines (see
Requirement 10, Table 2). The second role
is the movement of software tools and mal-
ware into the VMs and extraction of log files
created out of these environments.
The Oracle Due to the lack of any theo-
retical or easily determined ‘ground truth,’
the MATEF determines the expected quan-
tity of artefacts from an independent source
(see Requirement 14, Table 2). The random
nature of the artefacts generated by mal-
ware is such that the reported expected value
is little more than an approximation of the
‘ground truth.’ This source referred to as the
‘Oracle’ could conceivably be any one of a
number of online environments, such as that
provided by F-Secure (2011) and JoeSand-
box (2020).
Unlike online sandbox solutions to anal-
yse malware, use of offline tools enables the
investigator greater control of the test envi-
ronment. Control measures include the con-
figuration of virtual machines and the ability
to run tests repeatedly over extended peri-
ods of time to identify predictable artefacts.
The investigator can also control the distri-
bution of potential personally identifiable in-
formation that may be hard coded into a
custom-built malware binary. This mitigates
the risk whereby malware authors may be-
come alerted to an ongoing investigation by
publishing such binaries to a public online
platform (C. H. Malin et al., 2008).
Test environment The test environment
is managed via automated scripts and en-
ables multiple tests to be run in parallel
and thus reduce the time required for large
scale tool testing. In addition, this improves
the statistical power (and hence the statisti-
cal significance) of the results (Smith, 2012)
to address the anticipated variability of the
malware under analysis.
Internet simulation The provision of
network services (see Requirement 11, Ta-
ble 2) provides the MATEF with an added
level of realism to malware running within
the Test Environment. Lee et al. (2019) re-
port that as of 2017, over 90It is important
this network provision is simulated to min-
imise any risk of the malware stealing any
data or committing any unauthorised access
to other networks (see Requirement 1, Table
2). Requests and responses should be passed
to and from common network services that
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are exposed to the test environment through
the component.
Logs of network activity, together with
those generated by the tool under test, form
a significant product of the test environment
and feed into the analysis component.
Analysis component In order to under-
take analysis of a software tool, the analysis
component needs to establish three things.
The first of these is to establish what the
tool is to be compared against. As argued
above, this should be the expected quantity
(‘Expected value’) of artefacts observed, as
opposed to their value.
Secondly, the analysis component needs
the capability to extract the number of arte-
facts observed (‘Observed value’) by the tool
under test from a log file bearing a filename
that can be determined programmatically.
This will allow multiple log files from dif-
ferent VMs and test runs to coexist (see Re-
quirement 15, Table 2).
A third analysis requirement was that the
analysis components must establish an as-
sessment of the difference between the Ex-
pected and Observed values (see Require-
ment 7, Table 2). This is a critical value and
contributes to establishing the validity of the
tool under test. Variation of this value un-
der repeated testing also provides a measure
of the repeatability.
Summary Figure 1 shows how the compo-
nents described above are combined to form
the MATEF, together with the information
flows between the components. Note boxes
in grey are external components that cur-
rently sit outside the MATEF. At present,
the statistical analysis component is per-
formed using an independent statistical anal-
ysis tool. It is envisaged that future develop-
ment of the MATEF will include a statisti-
cal component within the MATEF. The next
section will discuss and evaluate the extent
to which the design of the framework has
met these requirements.
5. DISCUSSION
The discussion below reviews the framework
requirements, which are reproduced in Table
4, together with a summary of the discussion
points below.
The majority of the requirements are met
by the design of the framework; for example,
by handling the malware binaries via scripts
on a closed network, access to the malware is
restricted and minimises any accidental cross
contamination during testing (Requirement
1). In addition, the use of virtual machines
provides a platform for rapidly testing and
resetting test environments, addressing Re-
quirement 10, while the use of an Internet
simulator addresses Requirement 11 to pro-
vide a network service enabled environment
conducive to executing malware. Similarly,
the framework enables the use of a variety
of operating systems, particularly those that
are deemed more vulnerable, such as Win-
dows XP (Requirement 12).
The design of the framework also dis-
penses with the need to have knowledge of
the internal operation of a tool under test,
reflecting the real-world practice where prac-
titioners use closed source tools. Instead, the
framework provides a means to test the ex-
pected output of a tool under test (Require-
ment 13).
However, there are also some requirements
(Requirements 2, 5, and 6) that can only be
fulfilled after the work is released to the com-
munity for review and consideration of use
in practice. As a result, there is scope for
further work to evaluate these (see Further
Work in the next section).
The provision for reliability (Requirement
3) is comprised of the four elements of re-
liability, as defined by R v Lundy ([2013]
UKPC 28), see Table 4. For simplicity, these
will hereafter be referred to as the ‘Lundy
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Figure 1. MATEF components.
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requirements’ and identified individually as
‘L1’ through to ‘L4’, respectively.
These four elements are summarised in Ta-
ble 4 against Requirement 3. Two of these
four have been addressed by the design of
the framework and are indicated by check
marks ‘X’ in Table 4. First, the capabil-
ity for testing a technique (see Requirement
3, L1 in Table 4) is addressed by the de-
sign of the framework. Secondly, the rate of
error associated with a given software tool
observing malware artefacts can be deter-
mined through repeated measurements and
the use of statistical techniques (see Require-
ment 3, L3 in Table 4). The remaining two
elements of the Lundy requirements in Table
4 (L2 and L4) were not addressed and so are
marked with a cross ‘X’ in Requirement 3
of Table 4. These unaddressed requirements
mirror Requirements 5 and 6 of the frame-
work discussed above.
By publishing the hashes of malware sam-
ples sourced from openly shareable resources
such as VirusTotal (2010) and using these
during the testing of tools, practitioners
are able to collaboratively test their tools
against the same known and trusted datasets
(Requirement 9). Similarly, practitioners
can use the same independent source to de-
termine the expected number of artefacts
that are generated for a given malware bi-
nary (Requirement 14). The design of the
framework also allows for these artefacts to
be recorded and counted from a disparate
range of tools that are subject to testing (Re-
quirement 15).
However, the use of an independent source
is not without its problems. Critics of the
framework will point to how the require-
ments for validation (Requirements 4 and 7)
have yet to be fully addressed, given the de-
pendence on a third-party tool to provide
‘ground truth.’ The approach of comparing
the results of one tool with that of another
(online) one is little more than dual-tool ver-
ification.
Despite this, the framework’s test environ-
ment provides a means to test tools under
different conditions repeatedly at scale on
large numbers of malware binaries. This en-
ables statistical techniques to be applied and
thus establish greater confidence in an ob-
served value to a statistically significant de-
gree. This capability facilitates the response
to the requirement to provide an estimate for
uncertainty (Requirement 8).
Despite the ability to control the fre-
quency and conditions under which the mal-
ware is executed locally, it should be noted
that the use of online sandboxes to quantify
the number of expected artefacts for a given
category (i.e., creation, change, or deletion)
has one notable limitation: rather than pro-
viding a representative average quantity, on-
line sandbox tools may only execute samples
once and for no more than a maximum time
duration before terminating (Bayer, Habibi,
Balzarotti, Kirda, Kruegel, 2009). However,
the limitation is attributed to the use of on-
line sandboxes and not of the framework pro-
posed here. The use of online sandboxes was
one of convenience, speed, and choice (given
the variety of online tools available). Addi-
tionally, further work is possible here to inte-
grate an offline sandbox, which is under the
control of the investigator, to have greater
control in how ‘ground truth’ is established.
We discuss this in the next section.
6. CONCLUSIONS
AND FURTHER WORK
Despite the caveats identified previously, the
framework is a versatile platform enabling
experiments to be designed according to
user-defined protocols. One example is de-
termining the standard deviation from the
repeated execution of malware, hence pro-
viding an estimate of uncertainty. Indeed,
Hubbard (2014, p. 162) points out that
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where there is a lot of uncertainty in a quan-
tity, then very little data is needed to re-
duce the uncertainty significantly. Hence,
producing an estimate of the expected num-
ber of artefacts to be observed significantly
reduces the uncertainty in what is expected
from subsequent observations.
Support is currently limited to tools that
examine file, registry, and network artefacts,
such as those in the Sysinternals suite (Mi-
crosoft, 2020). The tool under test must be
capable of being initiated and configured (if
needed) via command line. To capture the
output of the tool, it must also provide a
means to export a log file (in any text-based
format). Future work could extend the sup-
port to GUI based tools.
The framework is in an early stage of its
life-cycle and so further work to critically
review and (where appropriate) adopt the
framework elsewhere would contribute to-
wards addressing the requirements of the
framework relating to critique and general
acceptance.
Additional further work could also include
the development of an offline oracle. This
would provide greater control over parame-
ters, such as execution times and the num-
ber of runs to better define and hence es-
tablish ground truth. A community vali-
dated oracle of reference data would pro-
vide the greatest level of confidence in the
results of the MATEF and could be based
on existing projects such as MAEC (Kirillov,
Beck, Chase, Martin, 2010) and (‘YARA’,
n.d.). Improving how ground truth is deter-
mined in this way also has the potential to
improve the validation requirements of the
framework.
There is also scope to harden the virtual
environment to minimise detection and eva-
sive behaviour by malware. Furthermore, fu-
ture work can be done to validate the frame-
work by implementing and testing it with
empirical data. Finally, there is room to also
engage with practitioners and other stake-
holders to gather feedback on the identified
requirements and design.
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Table 4. Review of requirements.
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